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EXCLUSIVE PATRONAGE CONTRACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
By W. M. SHEEHAN*
Legal Drafting Officer, International Air Transport Association.
A.B. and LL.B. Harvard University 1929, 1932. Member, New York
Bar.
A GREEMENTS between rate conferences and shippers, whereby
the shippers in return for specially reduced cargo rates use only
conference services, known as "exclusive patronage," "contract-non
contract" or "dual-rate" contracts, are not employed in international
air transportation today. They are, however, extensively used by ocean
liner conferences. Since they have proved themselves most useful in
protecting the established maritime rate structure', the question arises,
can such contracts be made part of the conference machinery of the
scheduled international air cargo operators2?
With a view to answering this question it is proposed to consider,
first, the status of exclusive patronage contracts in maritime usage today
and, second, the legality of such contracts if put to similar use by the
scheduled international air cargo operators. Maritime usage is con-
sidered first because the legality of exclusive patronage contracts has
been more fully explored in that sphere and the result is bound to
have a strong, although not necessarily conslusive, effect on ultimate
usage in international air transportation.
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
Of approximately 100 shipping conferences concerned with the
foreign commerce of the United States, more than 80%o have incorpo-
rated some sort of exclusive patronage contract into their rate struc-
tures. This is done by including in the basic conference agreement
4
a provision authorizing the dual rate system in conjunction with
exclusive patronage contracts.
*Opinions are the author's and do not necessarily reflect views of the International
Air Transport Association.
I See Inter-American Maritime Conference, Report of Delegates of the United
States, Washington, 1941, where at p. 7 it is said:
"It is the judgment of the Maritime Commission that the conference system
is necessary to the successful conduct of water-borne foreign trade which is of
an international character but that conferences cannot continue to exist in foreign
trade without some means of protection such as the conference contract system."
See also Rept. of U.S. Mar. Comm. p. 17-18 (1946).
2 Scheduled international air rates for both passengers and cargo are estab-
lished by the three traffic conferences of the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation. See Sheehan, The IATA Traffic Conferenoes, 7 Southwestern Law Journal
135 (1953).
3 Marx International Shipping Cartels, p. 207, (1950) Professor Marx's
treatise is an excellent study of the current shipping conference situation and has
been most useful in the preparation of this article.
4 Each conference has a basic agreement in the nature of a charter or
articles of association setting out the rights and obligations of members.
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The form of exclusive patronage contract differs from conference
to conference, depending on the nature of the trade and the particular
requirements of the operators and shippers concerned. But generally
they are alike. The one in use between members of the North Atlantic
Continental Freight Conference 5 and their shippers is fairly typical
and will serve as an example.
That contract" provides that the shipper will forward by vessels of
conference carriers all commodities which he may ship during specific
periods, excluding bulk cargoes, household goods, explosives, hay, live-
stock, precious metals or human remains. The carrier agrees that the
rate to be paid by the shipper will be 10% below the applicable con-
ference rate existing when the contract is signed, with benefit to the
shipper of any reductions subsequently made by the conference. The
contract is to run for an initial period of not exceeding three months
and continue in force for successive periods of six months, unless either
party gives 60 days' prior notice of termination. The carrier agrees not
to increase the contract rates in any contract period, except in accord-
ance with certain notice provisions, to transport all commodities which
the shipper tenders and to maintain adequate service. If the carrier is
unable to reserve space within 3 days after application by the shipper
on a vessel sailing within 15 days of the desired time, the shipper is
free to make other arrangements, including forwarding by non-con-
ference vessels.
Although in use for a great many years7, only recently has any
serious question been raised as to the legality under American law of
exclusive patronage contracts. In October, 1948, Isbrandtsen Company,
Inc., a prominent American non-conference steamship operator,
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York to enjoin the North Atlantic Continental Freight and the
Continental North Atlantic Westbound Freight Conferences from
using such contracts and to have set aside certain rulings of the U.S.
Maritime Commission which authorized the dual rate system. The
District Court temporarily restrained the Conferences from using the
contracts and directed Isbrandtsen to file a complaint before the U.S.
Maritime Commission challenging the validity of the dual rate prac-
tice. The complaint was filed. After due proceedings, in December, 1950,
the Federal Maritime Board (which had succeeded the U.S. Maritime
Commission) upheld the contracts and dismissed Isbrandtsen's corn-
5 A voluntary association of some 13 lines operating between U.S. North
Atlantic and North Continental European ports. It and its predecessors on the
trade route have been in existence for about one hundred years.
6 This contract was approved by the Federal Maritime Board in January
1954. See Contract Rates, North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference et al,
FMB Case No. 724.
! Investigations by the British Government in 1909 (Report of Royal Com-
mission on Shipping Rings (London) and by the United States in 1914 (Report
of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Alexander Report)
H.R. Doc. 805, 63 Cong., 2nd Sess) recognized the general existence of exclusive
patronage contracts and expressly or implicitly approved their use.
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plaint8. Isbrandtsen then appealed to the District Court and asked that
Court to enjoin and set aside so much of the Federal Maritime Board
order as approved the dual rate practice. The United States, by its
Attorney General, appeared and the Secretary of Agriculture was per-
mitted to intervene9 , both in support of the injunction. The District
Court declined to rule on the validity of the dual rate system, but
granted a permanent injunction ° against use of the contracts on a
point not argued, that is, that the differential between the contract
and non-contract rates offered to shippers was arbitrarily determined
and unreasonable, therefore unjustly discriminatory and unlawful.
This decision was affirmed without opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court,
by a 4 to 4 vote, in March, 1952".
It is unfortunate that neither the District Court nor the Supreme
Court ruled on the validity of the exclusive patronage plan per se.
The Federal Maritime Board subsequently promulgated a rule of
procedure to provide for securing information from ocean carriers as
to the necessity and justification of using dual rates, 12 presumably with
a view to approving them if the differential between contract and non-
contract rates were found to be not arbitrary and not unreasonable.
Isbrandtsen, by advertisements in newspapers and otherwise, has in-
dicated its dissatisfaction with this action and its determination that
the validity of exclusive patronage contracts per se should be dealt with
by the courts. Since the Federal Maritime Board has primary jurisdic-
tion in such matters, it is necessary for the issue to be presented to and
settled initially by that body 3 . A proceeding for that purpose, is now
pending14. But the ruling of the Federal Maritime Board, when ob-
tained, will have to be reviewed by the Federal Courts and a final
decision may not be reached for years. Meanwhile, consideration of
the arguments against validity of exclusive patronage contracts per se,
which were appended without comment to the District Court opinion' 5,
may be useful in attempting to forsee what the ultimate decision on
that important issue will be.
The position of plaintiffs in the Isbrandtsen case was that in no
circumstances could an exclusive patronage contract based on dual rates
in a conference agreement be valid under the U.S. Shipping Act of
8 Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference et al,
3 F.M.B. 235 (1950).
9 It should be noted that the Department of Agriculture, while arguing for
open competition of ocean freights, favored fixed international prices for key
agricultural commodities.
10 Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. U.S. et at, 96 F. Supp. 883 (1951).
11 A/S J. Ludwig Mowinekles Rederi et at v. Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. et at, 72
S.Ct. 623, 312 U.S. 950, 96 L. Ed. (1952).
12 F.M.B. General Order 76, 10 November 1952.
1 See U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474; and Swayne and
Hoyt Ltd. v. U.S. 300 U.S. 297; also U.S. et at v. Far Eastern Conference et at,
94 F. Supp. 900, reversed on writ of certiotari to Supreme Court, 10 March, 1952.
14 F.M.B. Docket 725.
15 See Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. U. S. et at op cit. Judge Frank attached the
arguments without expressing an opinion as to their cogency.
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1916, as amended, 16 (hereinafter the Shipping Act), particularly the
third sub-division of Section 812 thereof, which reads:
"No common carrier by water shall, directly or indirectly ... Third.
Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse,
space accommodations when such are available, or resort to other
discriminating or unfair methods, because such shipper has patron-
nized any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair
treatment, or for any other reason... "
The Federal Maritime Board and the conferences maintained that
the above statute must be read in the light of the paramount purpose
of Section 814 of the Shipping Act, which provides:
"That every common carrier by water, or other person subject to
this Act, shall file immediately with the board a true copy . . . of
every agreement with another such carrier or other person subject
to this Act ... to which it may be a party or conform in whole or
in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving
or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special priv-
ileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroy-
ing competition ...
"The board may by order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agree-
ment, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not
previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discrimina-
tory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers,
or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their
foreign competitors, or to operate to the deteriment of the commerce
of the United States, or to be in violation of this Act, and shall
approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations ...
"Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this
section shall be excepted from the provisions of the Act approved
July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act to pro-
tect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopo-
lies,' and amendments and acts supplementary thereto . .."
According to this view, the Federal Maritime Board may authorize
exclusive patronage contracts under Section 814, unless it finds that
such contracts are unjustly discriminatory or unfair, operate to the
detriment of the commerce of the United States or are in violation of
the Shipping Act.
The Plaintiff's position is supported by five arguments. These, to-
gether with an analysis of each, are set out briefly below.
First Argument -The purpose of Section 814 was merely to
exempt from the anti-trust laws agreements destroying, or sub-
stantially reducing, competition among those carriers who choose
to join a conference. The first three sub-divisions17 of Section 812
16 39 Stat. 728 (1917), 40 Stat. 900 (1919), 46 U.S.C. Sees. 801-842 (1940).
17 The third sub-division is quoted in the text supra. The first two sub-divi-
sions read: "First. Pay or allow, or enter into any combination, agreement, or
understanding, express or implied, to pay or allow a deferred rebate to any ship-
per. The term 'deferred rebate' in this chapter means a return of any portion of
the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a consideration for the giving
of all or any portion of his shipments to the same or any other carrier, or for any
other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the completion of the
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were intended to prohibit the use of any method which would
coerce an independent carrier, under threat of financial ruin, to
become a member of a conference, thereby destroying rate com-
petition between independents and conference members to the
injury of American shippers. Since the tendency or effect of ex-
clusive patronage contracts is fully as deadly as deferred rebatesis
or fighting ships 19 in wiping out competition between a conference
and independents, Congress could not have intended to authorize
a conference to use such contracts. Such as interpretation would
work a repeal, by mere implication, of the anti-trust laws, far
beyond the express and limited repeal contained in Section 814.
Analysis - Repeal of the anti-trust laws by implication certainly
is not favored. But the exemption from those laws authorized by Sec-
tion 814 is specific and is sufficiently broad to justify approval by the
Federal Maritime Board of the exclusive patronage contracts. Congress
clearly contemplated that the Federal Maritime Board would in some
cases approve agreements, whether between conference members only
or between conference members and independents, giving or receiving
"special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advan-
tages."
It is true that, notwithstanding the foregoing exemption, Congress,
in the first and second sub-divisions of Section 812, outlawed "deferred
rebates" and "fighting ships," and by the third sub-division of that
Section forbid carriers to "retaliate" against shippers or to "resort to
other discriminating or unfair methods." But exclusive patronage con-
tracts are not in essence retaliatory. They are merely an arrangement
whereby those shippers, whose undertaking to use regularly conference
vessels makes possible the establishment and maintenance of regular
service, receive the monetary benefit which results from the more
efficient use of that service 20 . Superficially the contracts may seem unfair
because of the lower rates accorded to contract shippers. In fact they
are not, because the undertaking to use only conference vessels puts
contract shippers at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis shippers who have
service for which it is paid, and is made only if, during both the period for which
computed and the period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the terms
of the rebate agreement or arrangement.
"Second. Use a fighting ship either separately or in conjunction with any
other carrier, through agreement or otherwise. The term 'fighting ship' in this
chapter means a vessel used in a particular trade by a carrier or group of carriers
for the purpose of excluding, preventing, or reducing competition by driving
another carrier out of said trade."
18 The deferred rebate contract is similar to the exclusive patronage contract,
except that the shipper, to qualify for the discount, must have given all his busi-
ness to conference carriers not only for the contract period but for a subsequent
period as well.
19 A fighting ship is one operated at low rates to shippers for the sole purpose
of destroying competition.
20 The Inter-American Maritime Conference Report, op cit. at p. 7 states:
. when -a shipper signs a contract the conference carriers are assured of the
shipper's support, which results in a more regular and dependable flow of freight
traffic. This enables the steamship carriers to plan their schedules and conduct
their operations to better advantage and makes possible certain economies in the
solicitation of cargoes and the loading of vessels.'
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not so contracted and for that voluntarily assumed disadvantage they
are entitled to a reasonable compensatory advantage ratewise.
The Alexander Report, upon which the Shipping Act largely was
based, condemned fighting ships and deferred rebates21. It also dealt
at length and not unfavorably with exclusive patronage contracts. Con-
gress took occasion in Section 812 to prohibit the former specifically.
It is reasonable to suppose that had Congress intended to disagree with
the recommendation of its committee by prohibiting exclusive patron-
age contracts, it would have said so with at least equal force.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the dual rate arrangement in
Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937) would
appear to belie the argument of plaintiff stated above. In that case the
view that under some circumstances and with some percentage differ-
ential a dual rate plan may be valid was implicit. Moreover the argu-
ment of the Federal Maritime Board to this effect in the Isbrandtsen
case appears to have impressed the District Court, for in its opinion
the same assumption was expressly adopted.
Second Argument -Nowhere in the Shipping Act is there an
express delegation of authority to the regulatory agency to fix
maximum rates for foreign commerce. Whereas the Alexander
Report had recommended that the proposed regulatory agency
have power to order just and reasonable maximum rates with
respect to both domestic and foreign commerce, Congress granted
such power merely for domestic commerce. As to foreign com-
merce, Congress delegated authority only to forbid unjustly dis-
criminatory rates. This failure to delegate complete authority over
foreign rates indicates an intent that shipping conferences should
not act as complete monopolies and therefore should not have the
right to use any such monopolistic device as the exclusive patron-
age contract.
Analysis- Although Congress has not vested in the Federal Mari-
time Board express authority to prescribe maximum foreign rates, it
has vested in that body indirect authority over such rates. Common
carriers by water are required to file with the Federal Maritime Board
agreements fixing rates in the U.S. foreign trades within 30 days of the
date of their becoming effective. If the Federal Maritime Board re-
gards any rate in an agreement filed with it as unreasonably high, it
can disapprove either the specific rate agreement of the pertinent basic
conference agreement as operating "to the detriment of the commerce
of the United States." The Federal Maritime Board and its predecessors
have so construed their powers2. To be sure this authority does not
21 See Note (7) supra.
22 Thus in Edmond Weil v. Italian Line "Italia", 1 U.S.S.B. 395, 398 (1935)
it is said: "An unreasonably high rate is clearly deterimental to the commerce of
the United States, and upon a showing that a conference rate in foreign com-
merce is unreasonably high the Department (of Commerce) will require its
reduction to a proper level. If necessary, approval of the conference agreement
will be withdrawn."
See also Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart et at, 1 U.S.S.B. (1933); In the Matter of
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appear to have been exercised. But it seems clear from the language
used in Section 814 that the Board could do so if it saw fit23.
It does not necessarily follow that because Congress was explicit in
granting authority over domestic rates to the regulatory authority,
Congress would have been explicit if it had intended the regulatory
authority to have control over foreign rates. The United States has
complete jurisdiction over domestic rates but not over foreign rates.
Congress may have deemed it more appropriate in the case of foreign
rates to vest control indirectly in the regulatory authority because of
the multiplicity of jurisdictions to which such rates may be subject.
Furthermore, since no one State can effectively exercise unilateral
jurisdiction over foreign rates, Congress may have intended that only
occasional, rather than continual, active control of such rates would
be exercised by the U.S. regulatory body.
Third Argument -The usual basic conference agreement pro-
vides that rates cannot be changed, up or down, without the con-
sent of every member, and a considerable majority of members
of shipping conferences are foreign owned. Consequently, shipping
conferences, backed by an exclusive patronage contract system,
might put American shippers to a disadvantage because of their
ability to maintain rates, no matter how unreasonably high.
Analysis- American shippers are not necessarily at the mercy of
foreign shippers because of the conference rule which prevents rates
from being altered unless all members concur. Should any operator
or combination of operators seek to maintain conference rates at an
unreasonably high level by refusing to vote for lower rates and thereby
detrimentally affect the commerce of the United States, the Federal
Maritime Board, through its power under Section 814 to disapprove,
cancel or modify the basic conference agreement, could force recon-
sideration of such rates. For if the conference were dissolved, its mem-
bers then would be unable to make any agreement affecting U.S.
commerce without risking violation of the anti-trust laws. In other
words, conference operators would be confronted with the choice either
of eliminating the unreasonable rates or of having no agreemet whatso-
ever24.
Rates, Charges, Rules, Regulations, and Practices of the Common Carriers Parties
to the Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference Agreement, 2 U.S.M.C. 28
(1939); Pacific Forest Industries v. Blue Star Line, Ltd., 2 U.S.M.C. 54 (1939).
In Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. U. S. et al, op cit. the Federal Maritime Board re-
affirmed this view.
28 In acting upon resolutions of the IATA Traffic Conferences under a statute
similarly silent as to the power of the regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics
Board has withheld approval, or threatened to do so, where agreed foreign rates
were deemed too low or too high. See for example, CAB Orders E-5623, 17 Aug.
1951, and E-8103, 15 February, 1954. For statute, see text II International Air
Cargo Transportation, infra.
241t is of interest that the Civil Aeronautics Board in its approval of the
basic conference agreement of the International Air Transport Association traffic
conferences (which has always been limited to a period of one, two or three years)
has invariably included a condition that no collateral agreement fixing rates, fares
or charges will be approved if it provides an effectiveness period of more than one
year. For example, see CAB Order No. E-6390, I May, 1952.
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Fourth Argument-Section 814 of the Shipping Act makes it
necessary for the Federal Maritime Board to withhold approval
from any conference agreement which is in violation of the Act.
The third sub-division of Section 812 prohibits "discriminating"
methods. Exclusive patronage contracts discriminate between con-
tract and non-contract shippers. When used elsewhere in the
Shipping Act "discriminating," "discriminatory" or "discrimina-
tion" are invariably modified by some term such as "unjustly" or
"unreasonable ' ' 25. Therefore, the omission of any such qualifica-
tion in the third sub-division of Section 812 is significant and has
the effect of outlawing, not only unreasonable discrimination, but
all discrimination. It should be noted with respect to this sub-
division that, whereas the Alexander Report recommended that
all carriers should be prohibited from resorting to "other unfair
methods of discrimination," the Act which finally resulted used
instead the words "other discriminating or unfair methods."
Analysis-It must be conceded that the third sub-division of Sec-
tion 812 of the Shipping Act forbids "discriminating" methods and that
the exclusive patronage contract is in a literal sense a "discriminating"
method. But it is difficult to conceive that the recommendation of the
Alexander Report, which would have vested in the Federal Maritime
Board the same administrative control over discriminating methods
as is vested over other discriminations (that is, forbid them only where
they are found to be unfairly, unreasonably or unjustly discriminatory)
was deliberately rejected by Congress. An absolute prohibition of dis-
crimination in rate methods is impracticable. Virtually every rate
structure approved by regulatory authorities admits and has to admit
of some degree of discrimination. Thus, it is an accepted tariff practice
to accord a lower rate per ton-mile of service for larger shipments than
for smaller shipments. Strictly speaking, this is a discriminating method
as between shippers of large consignments and shippers of small ship-
ments. But it is economically desirable to encourage large shipments.
Again, commodity rates, for example, $10 per ton for nitrates, $5 per
ton for lumber, etc., are an obvious discrimination as between shippers.
But this discrimination is universally regarded as necessary and desira-
ble to develop full traffic potential. It is inconceivable that such discrim-
inating methods were meant to be prohibited by the Shipping Act:
such a construction has never been suggested. It must be assumed,
therefore, that Congress' failure to accept the language recommended
by the Alexander Report was unintentional, and that Congress in the
third sub-division of Section 812 must have intended to outlaw only
unfair, unreasonable or unjust methods of discrimination.
Plaintiff argued that in Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 22
F. Supp. 533, 538, Judge Learned Hand in interpreting the unmodified
25 For example, fourth sub-division of See. 812, also Sees. 814, 815 and 816
of the Shipping Act.
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term "discriminating" in the third sub-division of 49 U.S.C.A. Sect. 226
concluded that the term must be interpreted peremptorily. However
in that case the discrimination clearly referred to rates, fares and charges
between connecting lines, where the Congressional intent could well
have been to make the prohibition absolute. That statute relates for
example, to the situation where there are a number of interline rout-
ings between two points and it is desired that a shipper shall be charged
exactly the same by one route as by another. In the third sub-division
of Section 812, "discriminating" refers to "methods" resorted to by a
carrier against a shipper and the context in which these two words are
used is so broad as to have possible application to the general rate
structure; therefore, "discriminating" must have been intended in its
usual relative sense.
Fifth Argument -A law which permits the Federal Maritime
Board to approve exclusive patronage contracts is of doubtful
constitutionality because it is the same as granting to a conference
the power to include or exclude independent enterprise from a
trade. Such a statute is tantamount to giving a private cartel the
power to issue certificates of convenience and necessity with no
statutory criteria to guide their issuance.
Analysis -Although shipping conferences are monopolistic in
character, they are not and cannot be complete monopolies. In the first
place, they lack that common ownership and control which is essential
to true monopoly: they are in fact associations of independent enter-
prises with important conflicting interest and loyalties, for example,
national flag rivalries 27 . Second, to a large degree conferences are com-
prised of government owned or controlled shipping concerns and to
26 Which reads: (underlining supplied) "(1) It shall be unlawful for any
common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company,
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point,
or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
"(2) No carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this Act shall deliver
or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by it until all
traffic rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and
regulations as the commission may from time to time prescribe to govern the
settlement of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination:
Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit
any carrier from extending credit in connection with rates and charges on freight
transported for the United States, for any department, bureau, or agency thereof,
or for the District of Columbia.
"(3) All carriers, engaged in the tronsportation of passengers or property,
subject to the provisions of this chapter, shall, according to their respective
powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of
traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and de-
livering of passengers or property to and from their several lines and those
connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates, fares and charges
between such connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any such connecting line in
the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper. .... "
27 A British view is that "A shipping conference is a meeting in which com-
petitors face one another with the object of achieving that minimum of co-opera-
tion which will suffice to prevent such choatic competition as might render
impracticable the liner system of working ships." Thirty-eighth Report of the
Imperial Shipping Committee (1939) p. 51.
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the extent that they are, they tend to be endowed with a public, rather
than a private, consciousness. Third, shipping conferences are subject
to whatever authority any government concerned may see fit to exer-
cise, and, in the case of American foreign commerce, they are subject
to a considerable degree of supervision and regulation by the Federal
Maritime Board. Finally, a crucial factor in determining the degree of
monopoly a conference may enjoy is the ability to exclude potential
competitors from its membership. It is the announced policy of the
U.S. regulatory authority, in passing upon basic conference agreements,
:o require a clause permitting the admission as a conference member
of any line seeking admission on equal terms with existing members28 .
It seems clear, therefore, that the authority vested in the Federal
Maritime Board to approve exclusive patronage contracts is not the
equivalent of giving to a private cartel the power to issue certificates
of convenience and necessity and that the statute is entirely constitu-
tional.
Practical Considerations
Overriding any of the five arguments mentional above is a practical
consideration which of itself could justify a decision upholding the
power of the Federal Maritime Board to approve exclusive patronage
contracts. Since there is no international governmental regulatory
body, shipping conferences must be recognized as the legitimate means
whereby the shipping industry can establish and preserve a stable rate
structure for the good, not only of the ship operators, but of shippers
and the general publics of many States as well. The Federal Maritime
Board, and its predecessors, whose opinion should carry great weight,
have maintained consistently that the successful functioning of shipping
conferences is essential to the maintenance of good international ship-
ping services 29 . But without some protective device such as the exclusive
patronage contract, shippers woud have no inducement to deal with
conference members, and independent shipping operators offering rates
slightly below those of the conference operators could and would tend
to draw trade to their lines. Non-conference operators, which usually
maintain irregular schedules, could offer such lower rates because they
would be free to sail at will and, if it suited their purpose best, only
after they had accumulated full loads. Conference members would be
obliged to give service on regular routes, whereas non-conference
operators could adjust their services to tap trade wherever it was most
profitable to them. No conference operator could afford to suffer such
disadvantages for long, and so conferences would cease to function. For
this reason, if for no other, it would seem that the Shipping Act should
be so construed as to permit the Federal Maritime Board within its
administrative discretion, and subject to the particular contracts not
2s Inter-American Maritime Conference op. cit. at 175. See also Pacific Coast
European Conference, J.U.S.C.M. 11, 14 (1948).
29 See Note (1) supra.
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being arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory, to approve or dis-
approve exclusive patronage contracts.
It is to be expected, then, that the validity of exclusive patronage
contracts per se under the U.S. Shipping Act ultimately will be upheld.
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO TRANSPORTATION
So much for the status of exclusive patronage contracts in foreign
water transportation under the Shipping Act. Now to consider the
validity of such contracts in foreign air transportation, under the gov-
erning United States statute, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as
amended ° (hereinafter the Civil Aeronautics Act).
The Civil Aeronautics Act in many respects is similar to the Ship-
ping Act. Both are based on the same philosophy of regulated com-
petition, provide for similar semi-judicial administrative bodies and
have evolved from the same statutory model, the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887.
Section 41231 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, setting up machinery
for approval or disapproval of agreements is similar to Section 814 of
the Shipping Act, the chief difference (of minor consequence here)
being that the Federal Maritime Board may disapprove, cancel or
modify any agreements it deems to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair
or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States
or to be in violation of the Shipping Act and shall approve all others,
whereas the Civil Aeronautics Board shall disapprove any agreement
it finds to be adverse to the public interest or in violation of the Civil
Aeronautics Act and shall approve all others.
Section 404 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act which deals with dis-
crimination and which is almost identical to the first sub-division of
Section 81532 of the Shipping Act, states that:
30 Act of June 23, 1938 (Public No. 706, 75th Congress 52 Stat. 977; 49 U.S.
Code 401) as amended by Act of July 2, 1940.
31 It reads: "(a) Every carrier shall file with the Authority a true copy,
or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum of every contract or agreement
(whether enforceable by provisions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds, or
otherwise) affecting air transportation and in force on the effective date of this
section or hereafter entered into, or any modification or cancellation thereof,
between such air carrier and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other
carrier for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service, or equipment,
or relating to the etsablishment of transportation rates, fares, charges, or classi-
fications, or for preserving and improving safety, economy, and efficiency of
operation, or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating
destructive, oppressive, or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, schedules,
and character of service, or for other cooperative working arrangements.
"(b) The Authority shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public
interest, or in violation of this Act, and shall by order approve any such contract
or agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find
to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this Act .... "
32 It reads: "That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or
other person subject to this chapter, either alone or in conjunction with any other
person, directly or indirectly-First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of
traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or
description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever.... "
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"No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any par-
ticular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air trans-
portation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
Section 404 (b) in conjunction with Section 41133 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act has the same general effect with respect to discrimina-
tion affecting foreign commerce, as Sections 812, 815 and 816 s4 of the
Shipping Act. However, the Civil Aeronautics Act contains no language
specifically forbidding deferred rebates, fighting ships or retaliatory
practices, as are dealt with in Section 812 of the Shipping Act, and in
particular omits any wording similar to that in the third sub-division
of Section 812 outlawing "discriminating" methods, upon which the
Isbrandtsen case has largely been based. Therefore use by scheduled
international air cargo operators of exclusive patronage contracts does
not have to get over the legal hurdle of peremptory discrimination. On
this issue, it should be sufficient, in accordance with Section 404 (b),
above, merely for it to be shown that such contracts do not result in
"unjust" discrimination or in "undue or unreasonable" prejudice or
disadvantage.
The failure of Congress to vest in the regulatory body direct control
over foreign rates, which concerned the court in the Isbrandtsen case
(see SECOND ARGUMENT above), does not seem so formidable with
respect to control of foreign air rates. As previously noted,3 5 the
Civil Aeronautics Board appears to have no difficulty in construing
that it is empowered under Section 412 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics
Act to disapprove agreements providing for unreasonable foreign rates
on the ground that they are adverse to the public interest.
33 It reads: "The Authority may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint
by any air carrier or foreign air carrier, if it considers that such action by it
would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air
carrier or foreign air carrier has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive prac-
tices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation. If the Authority
shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier or foreign air carrier
is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition,
it shall order such air carrier or foreign air carrier to cease and desist from
such practices or methods of competition."
34 Section 816 reads: "No common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall
demand, charge, or collect any rate, fare or charge which is unjustly discrimina-
tory between shippers or ports, or unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United
States as compared with their foreign competitors. Whenever the commission
finds that any such rate, fare, or charge is demanded, charged or collected it may
alter the same to the extent necessary to correct such unjust discrimination or
prejudice and make an order that the carrier shall discontinue demanding, charg-
ing, or collecting any such unjustly discriminatory or prejudicial rate, fare, or
charge.
"Every such carrier and every other person subject to this chapter shall
establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices re-
lating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of
property. Whenever the commission finds that any such regulation or practice is
unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced . just and
reasonable regulation or practice."
35) See Note (23) supra.
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Assuming therefore that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the statu-
tory power to approve exclusive patronage contracts, it remains to
consider whether the Board would exercise its authority so as to approve
such contracts, and whether on an appeal from such a decision the
courts would be likely to support that decision.
Taking the second of these points first, although the courts could
as a matter of law upset a decision reached by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, it is clear that they would be greatly influenced by the ruling of
the regulatory body charged with administering air transportation
under the Civil Aeronautics Act, particularly insofar as any material
question of fact is concerned. The Supreme Court has stated consist-
ently in reviewing decisions of semi-judicial regulatory agencies that
it will, because of the agency's greater closeness to and preoccupation
with the industry regulated, support such decisions as much as pos-
sible36.
In accordance with Section 412 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act
the Civil Aeronautics Board is bound to ask itself two things:
(i) are exclusive patronage contracts in violation of the Act, that
is, are they unjust or unreasonable in the sense of Section 404 (b),
or unfair in the sense of Section 411 or,
(ii) are such contracts adverse to the public interest?
To justify approval, the Board must find negatively on both counts.
Whether the contracts would be deemed to be unjust, unreasonable
or unfair in the sense of Sections 404 (b) and 411 would probably de-
pend upon the particular facts of the dual rate structure. For example,
how great a differential exists in the rates actually charged to contract-
ing shippers on the one hand and to non-contracting shippers on the
other. But, as in the Isbrandtsen case, it does not seem likely that the
exclusive patronage contracts would be found to be invalid per se.
In line with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Swayne & Hoyt Ltd.
v. U.S., as applied or implied by the Federal Maritime Board and the
Federal District Court, it is to be expected that under some circum-
stances, and with some percentage differential, the Civil Aeronautics
Board would be willing to approve such contracts.
Whether the contracts would be regarded as contrary to the public
interest is dependent upon the Board's general attitude toward air
traffic conferences and the need and desirability of protecting them
vis-a-vis non-conference competition. In the opinion of this writer, a
strong case can be made in behalf of a policy of protection.
In the first place, some sort of conference machinery is indispensable
to a just and reasonable air rate structure throughout the world. With-
out it the tens of thousands of international rates which must be ap-
plied by more than 100 air transport enterprises cannot be established
and maintained. As previously related, shipping conferences have
learned by experience, costly to carriers, shippers and public alike, that
the alternative to rate conferences is cut-throat competition, unreliable
86 See Note (13) supra.
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schedules and unpredictable tariffs. The U. S. agencies responsible for
regulating sea transportation, the Federal Maritime Board and its
predecessors, have stated repeatedly their conviction that such a ma-
chinery is essential for the proper functioning of foreign sea commerce.
The need of it for international air transportation is, if anything,
greater. Maritime rates can, generally speaking, be isolated to a given
set of points, because sea routes begin at the port of embarkation and
terminate at the port of debarkation. Air rates, on the other hand, are
inter-dependent the world over, because air routes in a very real and
practical sense, have no beginning or end. The rate between New York
and Singapore via India not only has an effect on the rate between
New York and a point beyond, say, Manila, but it also has an important
effect on the rate between New York and Singapore the opposite way
around the world, via the Pacific. In other words international air
rates simply cannot be established piece-meal. Each one must be deter-
mined in relation to hundreds or even thousands of others, some of
which may be geographically quite remote.
Secondly, there is an established conference machinery. The air
traffic conferences of the International Air Transport Association are
the recognized mechanism for establishment and maintenance of inter-
national air rates. Of the vast network of bilateral governmental agree-
ments regulating the right of commercial flight between Statess7 a large
number recognize the rate machinery of the International Air Trans-
port Association as the appropriate agency for agreeing international
air rates. To be sure these agreed rates are subject to the approval of
the governments concerned, and in the event of failure to agree, the
governments undertake to arrange settlement either by mutual negotia-
tion or by mediation s . But it is unlikely that the entire world rate
structure could be established in the first instance by governments
themselves. For the latter would then have to establish departments
of technicians and experts, duplicating the large staffs which in any
case are required by the transport companies. Moreover the existing
bilateral machinery is obviously not designed for establishment of rates
on a multi-national basis.
Thirdly, without some sort of device similar to that which the U.S.
regulatory authorities have considered necessary for protection of the
shipping conferences, successful functioning of the air traffic confer-
ences will be jeopardized. Non-conference operators cannot, of course,
be bound by conference agreed rates. If they exercise their freedom -
as some are doing and many would do - to set rates below those of the
conferences, they will tend to draw to their aircraft all the traffic avail-
able. Not being bound to regular schedules, as are conference opera-
tors, they can if necessary wait for full loads and so operate at a lower
cost per unit of service rendered than conference operators. Moreover
37 For a detailed description of the bilateral machinery, see Cooper Right to
Fly. (1947) pp. 178-188.
38 See Annex to Air Services Agreement between U.S. and U.K., signed at
Bermuda 11 Feb. 1946.
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they are free to vary their routes to tap markets which are temporarily
attractive, and so skim off the most desirable traffic. Conference mem-
bers will therefore withdraw from the conferences, and eventually the
latter will lose their ability to discharge the responsibility with which
governments have charged them. As a matter of experience, before this
happens some off-setting advantage should be accorded to conference
operators. There may be a more suitable arrangement: but the device,
approved by the maritime regulatory authorities and long used by
shipping conferences, an arrangement which tend to tie shippers to
regular conference operators, and which has proved itself generally
useful and acceptable in its own transport sphere, merits careful con-
sideration by the U.S. air regulatory authorities.
What degree of protection may be justified is, of course, within the
province of the governments concerned. It is conceivable that under
some circumstances, for example, along certain routes, no protection
may be warranted. Along others, protection may be needed and the
degree can be controlled, if an exclusive patronage arrangement is
employed, by varying the differential between the contract and non-
contract rates. In some cases a 5% differential may be required to put
non-conference and conference operators on an equally competitive
basis. In other cases a 15% or 20% differential may be necessary. Inso-
far as air traffic into or out of the United States is concerned, it would
be up to the Civil Aeronautics Board, by continual supervision and
control, to ensure that the differential employed by the conferences is
just and fair to all concerned and in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is considered likely that the exclusive patronage
system currently employed by the shipping industry will be held valid
under the U.S. Shipping Act, that a similar arrangement for the benefit
of international air cargo transportation should be held valid under
the Civil Aeronautics Act and that such an arrangement prudently
applied by the IATA Traffic Conferences and carefully supervised by
the Civil Aeronautics Board could be a sound and desirable develop-
ment in international air cargo transportation.
